Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Ninth Report by the Commission of the European Communities on Competition Policy (Doc. 1-127/80), Working Documents 1980-1981, Document 1-867/80, 13 February 1981 by Moreau, J.P.
13 February 1981 
English Edition 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1980- 1981 
DOCUMENT 1-867/80 
Report 
drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
I Ninth Report by the Commission of the European Communities oo 
Competition Policy (Doc. l-127/80) 
Rapporteur: Mr J.P. MOREAU 
PE 67.815/fin. 

The Commission of the European Communities has forwarded to the 
European Parliament the Ninth Report on Competition Policy (published 
in connection with the 13th General Report on the Activities of the 
European Communities). 
The European Parliament referred this report to the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs at its plenary sitting of 19 May 1980. 
On 28 May 1980 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
appointed Mr Moreau rapporteur. It considered this report at its 
meetingsof 20/21 and 29 January 1981. 
At its meeting of 29 January 1981, the Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs adopted the motion for a resolution by 18 votes 
with 7 abstentions. 
Present: Mr DELORS, chairman; Mr MACARIO and Mr DELAU, vice-chairmen; 
Mr J.P. MOREAU, rapporteur; Mrs BADUEL GLORIOSO (deputizing for Mr PIQUET ) 
Mr BALFOUR, Mr BEAZLEY, Mr BEUMER, Mr v on BISMARCK, Mr BONACCINI, Mr CABORN , 
Miss FORSTER, Mr De GOEDE, Mr DELOROZOY, Mr HERMAN, Mrs LANGE (deput izing 
for Mr WALTE R) , Mr LEONARD, Mr MARKOZANIS, Mr MIHR, Mr NYBORG, Mr PETRONIO, 
Mr PURVIS (deputizing for Mr HOPPER), Mr SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN-BERLEBURG, 
Mr SEAL (deputizing for Mr ROGERS) and Mr von WOGAU 
- 3 - PE 67.815/ fin. 
CONTE NTS 
A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION.. .......... . • • . . . . . • . • • . . . • . • . • . • 5 
B. EXPlANATORY STATEMENT. • . • • • . • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • . • • • . • • . • • • • • 13 
I. Genuine competition... .......... .. .... .. ... ... . ...... 14 
A. The application of the rules on competition 
B. 
c. 
II. 
contained in the Treaties. .... ... ......... .. . .... 14 
1 . The application of Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty and Articles 65 and 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty. . . . . • • • • • • . • • . . • • . • • . . • • . • . • . • . • . 14 
practice based on decisions......... ...... 14 
the formulat ion of regulations. ........... 16 
(a) distribution agreements .. . ... ........ 16. 
~) industrial property . ........ ......... 17 
2. The scope of the rules on competition 
contained in the Treaties.. . .. ...... . ........ 18 
The approximation of national laws •••...•...••••• 19 
1. Principal developments during 197 9 - 1980 .... 19 
2. Legal provisions on monopolies. .............. 1 9 
3. Elimination of technical and administrative 
barriers to trade..... ...................... . 2 0 
4. Tax harmonization.......... . ... .............. 21 
International codification of r ules on 
competition ..•.•..• •...•••••••••.....• ••.• • • ••••. 23 
1. Work concerning restrictive practices 
in international trade •••..• .•.•.• • ..•. . .••.. 23 
2. Tax havens..... .................. . .... .... . .. 244 
3. Flags of convenience........ ........ ... ...... 25~ 
Controlled competition ••••• .• • •••.••...•...•••••. 25 
A. Supervision of the activities of private 
firms.......... ................... .......... 25 
B. Supervision of the activities of public 
undertakings. .... . .......... ................ 27 
c. Controlling the activities of transnational 
undertakings... . ..... . .... ..... . ....... .. .. . 27 
D. Aid to small and medium-sized undertakings •• 29 
4 PE 67. 815 / fi n 
III. Beneficial competition ••••••••.••••.•••••.....•.• :w 
A. The merits of competitiveness for the 
economy. • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • . • 3 0 
(a) integration of aid...................... 31 
(b) social and r egional requirements........ 32 
(c) the consistency of Conununity policies... 33 
B. The merits of competition for the consumer... 33 
(a) prices...................... . ........... 34 
(b) price anomalies.................... . .... 34 
(c) the involvement of consume r s in 
competition policy...................... 35 
4a PE 67. 815; fin 

A 
The Committee on Economic and Mone t ary Af fairs hereby submits to the 
European Pa r liament the following mo t ion for a r e solution. together with 
explana t ory statement : 
MOTJ,O~- FOI~ T\ HE.Ss_)l.ll' l'"l ON 
On th e Ni nt h Repor L o f Lhe Commission o f l11e l ~ u r upean l'olltmltniL ies un 
Competition Policy (published in connection with the Thirteenth General 
Report by the Commission of the European Con~unities). 
The~~ropean Parliament 
having regard to the Ninth Report of the Commission of the European 
Communities on Competition Policy (Doc. 1-127 180), 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affai r s (Doc. 1-867 180), 
1. Considers that, in the context of the European economy competion 
should be an important factor for regulating markets for preventing 
distortion, for ensuring the efficiency of the economy and for consumer 
protection ; 
2. Notes, however, that in the current period of recession which is 
character i zed by minimal growth, chronic high inflation, structural 
changes and disparities in development between the countries of the 
Community, the threat of distortion of competition is growing in all 
its forms and at every level and could jeopardize the concept of the 
single market 
3. Observes that the number of decisions taken by the Commission has 
decreased over the years and that the time taken for carrying out 
investigations has increased 
4. Cal l s on the Commission, in view of the difficulties facing the 
Community and its Member States to utilize its extensive powers 
in this field and implement a more active and comprehensive policy: 
this pol i cy must be adapted to economic and soc i al developments in 
the Community in order to ensure that rules are adopted which 
guarantee genuine competition that is both equitable as regards 
producers and beneficial to the Community's economy in general and 
consumers in particular ; 
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. . 
independence of the Commission as regards the pursuitof a competition 
policy must be fully safeguarded, but that the Commission must seek 
ways of involving employers' organizations, trade unions and consumer 
associations in competition policy, more specifically through the 
provision of information; considers further that the European Parliament 
and its responsible committee may exercise their indispensable supervisory 
powers in this respect; 
- 9~~~!~~-29~E~~~~!9~ 
6. Notes that genuine competition implies standardization and greater 
harmonization of the conditions of competition, which presupposes: 
the application of the rules on competition enshrined in the 
Treaties, 
the approximation of national legislation in this field, and 
substantial progress in the international codification of these 
rules: 
7. Emphasizes the cardinal role played by the Commission in the application 
of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and of Articles 65 and 66 of 
the ECSC Treaty and urges it again to seek to implement a more rapid and 
more transparent procedure for dealing with cases submitted to it, one 
which, however, takes due account of the rights of the defendants and 
therefore calls for improvement wherever possible to the practical 
applications if the relevant procedural rules and requests: 
(a) that the Commission provide each member of the Advisory Committee 
at least two weeks prior to their meetings with transcripts of the 
Commission's decision and the reply filed by the defendants against 
the statement of infringement and with a copy of the minutes of the 
oral hearing; 
(b) that the Court make more frequent use of its Articles 24 and 61 of 
its Rules of Procedure to review the Commission's fact findingand to 
reopen the oral proceedings in cases where the Advocate-General's 
opinion is alleged to contain errors of fact. 
8. Calls on fue Commission to make all necessary arrangements to provide 
more extensive information on the aims and principles of ns competition 
policy to consumer associations and to trade union and employers' 
organizations; 
9. Takes the view that the Commission should seek the cooperation and 
support of all interested parties - consumers' organizations, national 
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monopoLr;s c omm i s sions and th~ Economic and Social Cor:~mittee- in o rder 
to improv e its possibil i ties for action through a better exchan ge 
of information and by pooling available resources and experience acquired ; 
10. Considers, finally, that a more effective competition policy cannot be 
implemented without an increase infue staff allocated; 
11. Emphasizes the persistent risks of market-sharing in the Community which 
may be engendered by certdin patent licensing agreements or certain 
exclusive dealing or distribution agreements and, in this respect: 
reminds the Commission of -its desire to receive as soon as 
possible the amended proposal for a regulation in respect of the 
exemption 0f patent licensing agreements, which regulation should 
not contain excessively restrictive provisions that would inhibit 
transfers of technology in the Community, 
also calls on the Commission to forwar d to it in good time the 
new proposal for a regulation concerning the exemption of certain 
types of exclusive dealing agreements and hopes that it will 
meet the wishes already expressed by the European Parliament 
concerning the exemption of agreements made between potential 
competitors, the acceptance of non-reciprocal exclusive deal ing 
arrangements between competitors where these are small and 
medium-sized undertakings and the size of the territory allotted 
to sole distributors in the case of advanced technology products, 
hopes that the Commission will submit at an early date a proposal 
for a regulation on the Community trademark and a European 
Trademark Office, 
invites the Commission, finally, in the light of its experience 
and after consulting the interested parties, to draw up more 
precise rules governing selective distribution agreements; 
12. Reaffirms its wish that the rules on competition should be applied 
as widely as possible; accordingly: 
(a) in the transport sector 
fears that the regulation for the application of the rules 
on competition to air transport at present being drawn up, 
if confined solely to the independent activities of airlines 
to the exclusion of activities which reflect national 
constraints, will not provide the instrument which the 
Commission needs to ensure the increase in competition in 
this field which the European Parliament hopes to see; 
hopes for the early submission of a proposal for a regulation 
on the application of the rules on competition to sea trans-
port, 
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(b) in the financial sector 
(c) 
umphaA .i.7.on thn nond to nxton(l l.hu n1lnr1 nn <'<~mpnl 1.1 in11 I" LIP ' 
l~.i.mtnelal sector and is surprisud that no mtntion J:-; made in tltU 
Ninth Report o£ any continuation of the enquiries undertaken by 
the Commiss i on in this field in 1979: 
urges the Commission once more to investigate, in conjunction 
with the financial authorities of the Member States, the obstacles 
which still restrict the free movement of capital and the 
development of a common organization of the credit market and 
how they may be eliminated; 
in the insurance sector 
calls once again on the Commission, in the absence of any mention 
of this subject in the report, to monitor closely the application 
of the rules on competition in all the insurance sectors; also 
asks the Commission to include in its next annual report a sunwary 
of its actions in this field and in the financial sector; 
. . 
1 th and presses for the adoption of the 1 Services 1 d~rect~ve , e 
absence of which is preventing competition across the frontiers 
of Member States; 
13. Notes that as in previous years, the chapter in the Ninth Report devoted 
to the principal developments in national policie s makes no mention of 
any spec ific initiatives taken by the Commission to remedy tne persistent 
deficiencies in certain Member States or the divergent trends in national 
competition policies; such measures are essentia l for the creation and 
development of a single market in various sectors; 
14. Calls on the Commission to pursue its activities relating to the adjustment 
of state monopolies of a commercial nature to ensure that, in the near 
future, none of the current commercial monopolies will be i n breach of 
Article 37 of the EEC Treaty; 
15. Recalls the serious threats to market unity caused by technical barriers 
to trade irrespective of whether they stem from mandatory legal provisions 
or from the varying standards adopted by national institutions; urges 
the Commission and the Council once again to extend immediately to al l 
barriers a simplified procedure for the elimination and prevention of 
technical and administrative barriers to trade under Article 155 of the 
Treaty; call s on the Counci l , in this connect ion, to adopt the directives 
now held up by lack o f decision on the third country problem; calls on the 
Commission to prevent the development of new barriers to trade b y creating 
l COM(80) 854/final 
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(ef·(:jc ic, its dicf:clives un harmonization; urges the Commission s~milarly, 
on the ·basis of the recent case law of the European Court of Justice 
relating to the application of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, to bring 
before the court every instance it detects of unjustified barriers to 
trade; .. 
16. Recalls that the inadequate harmonization of laws and the lack of 
transparency with regard to public contracts seriously hampers the 
standardization of the conditions of competition; calls on the 
Commission to keep a strict watch on compliance by the Member states 
with the directives adopted so far, since such compliance is 
unfortunately not always forthcoming; calls on the Commission, 
finally, to brook no delay in its work to ensure that the directive 
on supplies is extended in particular to the telecommunications, 
transport and energy sectors and to ensure that directives 
are designed in such a way that small and m8dium-sized undertakings also 
have a fair chance of participating; 
17e Recalls that the inadequacy of tax harmonization and fiscal control 
encourages tax avoidance and seriously interfe~with the equality 
of the conditions of competition; consequently: 
deplores the fact that the council has not yet adopted a number 
of proposals on tax harmonization, some of which, relating to 
company taxation, have been pending for several years, 
hopes that in the case of excise duty a solution will rapidly be 
found which puts an end to the current.distortion of competition, 
hopes that the Commission, in line with the wish expressed by the 
European Parliament last year, is now convinced that its harmoni-
zation proposals should not be limited to-collection systems but 
also extended to the structure of taxation rates and to the basis 
of assessment, 
calls on the Commission to seek, in conjunction with the.authorities 
of the Member States, a common approach to the fixing of energy 
prices which reflects representative market conditions and the cost 
of rep lac in·g energy sources and which ensures maximum transparency; 
18. Takes the view that the Community cannot, without weakening its own 
position, create a genuine internal competit:ion policy unless it 
actively seeks to extend the rules it imposes on itself to the other 
countries of the world; calls on the Commission, therefore, not to 
confine itself simply to participating in the a.ctivities of the inter-
national bodies concerned but to cont:ribute its utmost to : 
- 9 - PE 67.815/fin. 
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the c a mpaign aga inst international tax evasion , 
the a bolition of tax ~avcns , 
the elimination of flags of conveni~nce , 
t he abol ition of other unfair practices in the Einld o[ comp8lition; 
l9.Takes t he view that everything should be done , in the spiric of t he 
Treaties , to strive constantly to ensure stric t competition between the 
main e conomic operators, private firms, large undertakings, small and 
medUm-sized undertakings, public undertakings and transnational unde r -
t a kin g s ; 
20 . - Emphasizes that it is vital to mainta~n genuine equality of 
opportunity between pr~vate firms by means of the strict application 
of the rules on competition laid down in the Treaties: 
accepts that in a period of exceptional structural crisis a few 
close ly controlled agreements of limited duration may be necessary 
i n the European Community to assist restructuring under Commun i t y 
in dus trial policies: 
considers that the constant evolution of the market t~~ards a 
gene ral i zed oligopolistic structure lying somewhere , in the 
Con®ission's own words, 'between competition and collusion ' might 
se r iously threaten competition, and that an evolution of th i s 
nature requires the Commission to reshape its competition po l i c y 
with a view to preventing any irreversible evolution of the market 
by controlling concentrations in particular and bythe integr ation 
of a id ; 
deplor e s once again in this respect the fact that the Counc il h as 
still not a dopted the regulation on the control o f conc entrations 
which has been before it since 1974; 
2 1 . Welcomes the adoption by the Commission on 25 June 1980, pur suant to 
Article 90 of the EEC Treaty, of a first directive designe d t o ensure 
greater tran sparency of financial relations between Member State s and 
public unde rtakings; emphasizes that the scope of this d irective i s 
ve ry limite d a nd calls on the Commission to pursue its work withou t 
delay in o r de r to ensure equal transparency for most pub lic undertakings, 
especially i n the energy, transport and credit sectors; 
and deplores the actions of the Frenc h, Italian and UK Govern men t s 
h. ' h I 
w ~e n ave been brought before the Court of Justice in an effort to have 
t h is important d~rective annulled; 
OJ No C 27 3/80 p . S (Cases 188, 189 a n d 190/80) 
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22. K·!yrets that the commission decided not to include in its r eport a 
review of the action on the activities of transnational undertakings, 
contrary to the wish expressed b y the European Parliament; emphasizes 
that organized competition imples that the activities of transnational 
undertakings should be controlled without discrimination; deeply 
regras that the Commission has still not submitted a proposal on 
transfer prices; calls on the Commission to respond to the repeated 
requests made by the European Parliament for more information on the 
activities of transnational undertakings by including in its next 
report a summary of the progress made in this field, both within 
the Community and in the various international bodies; 
2 3 . Considers that an organized competition policy must take account 
of the specific disadvantages of the small and medium-sized 
undertakings so as to enable them to contribute fully to the 
dynamism of the economy7 recalls that in its previous report the 
European Parliament emphasized the need to promote favourable 
fiscal, financial, technological and administrative conditions for 
small and medium-sized undertakings7 notes with interest in this 
respect that in its communication on telematics, the Commission 
intends to improve the transfer of information to small and 
medium-sized undertakings and to facilitate the access of the small 
and medium-sized undertakings to the resources of the Regional 
Fund7 regrets that the report contains virtually no initiatives 
for the benefit of small and medium-sized undertakings and draws 
the Commission's attention to this matter; 
24 . Notes that because of its inadequacies, competition does not at 
present produce all the beneficial effects in the Community which the 
economy in general and consumers as a whole should enjoy7 
25. Recalls the need for close coordination at Community level of 
regional, sectoral and general aid policies and emphasizes the 
Commission's responsibilities in this field; urges the commission 
in particular to draw up a more expedient procedure for monitoring 
general aid schemes and export aids in view of the comparative 
dilatoriness of the present procedure; calls for the next report 
to contain a detailed review of the effects of the implementation 
of the Council Decision of 18 December 1979 establishing Community 
rules for specific aid to the iron and steel industry; calls on 
the Con~ission to seek maximum consistency between the various 
Community policies and the competition policy; requests the 
- ll - PE 67.815/fin. 
Commission to determine whether existing policy and meas ure s on 
competition - e.g. as regards the nature and extent of concentration -
take full account of the changed structural economic position and 
challenges facing the Community on the world market; 
26. Considers also that the rules on competition must be applied with 
great care to take account of the specja l nature of certain good s 
(e.g. books) and the ult i mate purpose o f certa in sc;rviccs (e.g. air 
transport) ; 
27. Notes that the oligopolization of the market may in some s ec tors 
reduce the scope and intensity of competition and may in some secto rs 
lead to artificially high price levels; 
that there are too many price anomalies; and 
that as a result the consumer is not benefiting as much as he 
should from competition as it stands at present in the Community; 
28. Stresses once again that the Commission must follow up its enquiries 
with practical measures designed to eliminate unacceptable price 
disparities; 
29. Instructs its President t o forward this resolution to the Commission 
and Council of the European Communities to the Court of Justice and to 
the parliaments of the Member States. 
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1. 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
In the European economy, competition plays an undebiable part 
and competition can serve economic policy in various different 
roles; in a combative role against rising prices, competition if 
it is genuinely respected tends to break up exclusive agreements 
between producers or distributors or at least to reduce their scope ; 
in an innovative role and as a factor of technical progress and 
rationalization of industrial structures, competition is particularly 
necessary at a time when a new international order is struggling to 
get on its feet. Finally, competition can be put to the service of 
consumers for whom it should ensure the best quality/price relationsh ip. 
But, to fulfil these various roles, compe tition must be genuine . 
The market must be sufficiently diverse not t o be manipulated by 
dominant undertakings, suff iciently transparent to allow the volume 
and value of transactions to be ascertained, and sufficiently flexible 
for the factors of production to be mobile eno ugh to follow shifts in 
demand. 
These conditions are clearly difficult to r ealize. What is 
more, competition policy is often in conflict with other demands such 
as those raised by policies for social protection or the defence of 
the vital interests o f i ndividual states. 
Thus competition policy has its merits but also its limi ts. 
Its r ole should therefore not be enhanced to the exclusion of other 
f actors; competition cannot be an end in itself. But t aking into 
account its limits, care has to be taken, as stated expressly in 
Article 3 (f) of the EEC Treaty , that competition is not 'distorted'. 
This is mainly the task of the Commission which possesses extensive 
powers in this field. It is for the European Parliament to assess, 
with particular regard t o the report put to it every year, whether 
the policy followed by the Comn1ission will guarantee the proper 
operation of the main functions of competition. 
In an economic and social situation which continues to be 
difficult and with the r isks of protectionism growing at all levels, 
the supervision exercised by the European Parliament and the latter's 
proposals take on a very special importance. Indeed competition has 
to be genuine and controlled if it is to be beneficial to t he economy 
and to the consumer. If the application of competition rules i s for 
the benefit of everyone in the Comn1Unity it must also be the concern 
of everyone in the Comnmnity . 
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I. GENUINE COMPETITION 
2. A continuous effort must ce made to increase the fairness of 
3. 
competition conditions otherwise there is no point in discussing 
competition at all and the market \vill be a fool's market 1vhich 
while maintaining the appearance of free competition is in fact 
given over to the most skilful, the best informed and most powerful 
economic operators to the detriment of those who keep to the rules. 
The standardization of competition conditions can be brought 
about by: 
- the strict application of the competition rules contained in the 
Treaties; 
- the approximation of national legislation concerning competition, 
- the progress on international codification of competition rules. 
A. The application of the rules on competition contained in the 
Treaties 
1. The application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and 
Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty 
There are two sides to the application of the competition rules 
contained in the Treaties: common practice based on individual 
decisions and, on the basis of this practice, the formulation of 
regulations wherever this is possible and desirable. 
- Practice based on decisions 
The Commission plays a cardinal role in the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Tr eaty and Articles 65 and 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty since it selects from its dossie r s those points which 
require its intervention, and the decisions which it consequently 
takes incur proceed ings before the Court of Justice. However, the 
number of decisions taken by the Commission during the last three 
years has been decreasing whilst the n'umber of cases settled amicably 
has remained at a standstill1 • 
Of course this decrease in the number of decisions largely 
corresponds either to the adoption of regulations exempting certain 
categories or to the 'test case' nature of certain decisions. 
1Application decisions: 
1977: 17 under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
197 8: u ~g~~~ ~ntgt~~ §~ ~g~ ~g 8i t1~~ ~~8CT~~~£~Y 
1 97 9 : ~6 under Articles GS and ~6 of the ECSC Treaty under Art~cles 8) and 8 of the EEC Treat y 7 under Art~cles uS and 6 of the ECSC Treaty 
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4. 
From this point of view the number of decisions adopted is not in 
itself significant. However, the Commission recognizes that this task 
is made more complicated by increasingly numerous and sophisticated defences 
worked out by the legal departments of the large undertakings. Consequently 
the decisions taken become more and more complex and their formulation 
requires more and more time although the staff at the Commission's 
disposal (80 A grade officials) is very inadequate compared with the staff 
of the 'Bundeskartellamt' (130) for example, or the American anti-trust 
authorities (about 1, 300) . Apart from seeking an increase in staff, the 
Commission should also solicit the support and cooperation of all those 
interested, i.e. cons umer organizations, national competition offices or 
departments, both sides of industry and the European Parliament and its 
appropriate committee, to improve information and pool resources and 
experience in order to remedy the unequal legal situation in which it often 
finds itself. 
Moreover, the European Parliament was concerned, on the occasion of 
the preceding report, about the procedure followed which is often too 
dilatory. As the credibility·and effectiveness of the competition policy 
depends on this procedure, the European Parliament recommended that t he 
Commission should take concrete measures to establish a simplifi0d 
l procedure • There is no trace of this in the ninth report. However on 
a particular point the Court of Justice 2 has recently explicitly recoynized 
the Commission's right in certain cases to take immediately applicable 
provisional me asures. This decision could take on great importance for 
European competition law in as far as the Con~ission will be able to order 
the immediate stoppage of particularly harmful competition practices . 
It is for the Commission to study how to implement this rigl1t. 
Finally, apart from its dilatoriness, the procedure for the application 
of articles relating to exclusive agreements and dominant positions would 
gain by being more democratic. This remark refers particularly to the 
membership of the Advisory Committee on Restrict ive Practices. 
Article 10 of Regulation No. 17 of 6 February 1962 provides that an 
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions should 
be consulted prior to any dec ision relating to the a pplication of 
Article s 85 and 86. This committee is made up of officials competent in 
this field des ignated by the Member States . 
1Damseaux report (Doc. l--265/79 ) , resolution parag r a ph 20 . 
2 Order of the European Court of Justice of 17 January 1980 in Case 792179, 
Camera Care Limited/Conm1ission of the European Communities. 
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5. 
In ~i~~ of the economic and social effects exerted by the state 
of the market and by any decisions r:=lating to competition policy, the 
membership of this comrr.ittee appears to be too restricted. The Conm1ission 
should therefore look into ways and means of enlarging its membership. 
It is also desirable that the social partners and cons~1er organi-
zations should be better informed about the work of the Commission in 
order to take full advantage of the consultation machinery provided for 
under the present provisions of Regulation No. 17(Articles 3 and 19). 
In this connection, the European Bureau of Consumers Unions has 
recently asked that consumer organizations should be consulted whenever 
the Commission intends to grant an exception to the ban on restricted 
practices. 
It would also be desirable, in order to complete the supervision 
procedure followed by the Commission with regard to competition policy , 
that the Economic and Social Committee should, like the European Parliament, 
de liver an opinion each year on the Conm1ission' s roport. 
When a body of practice has been established, the Commission works 
out or revises its regulations- The codification of contractual practices 
gives economic operators greater certainty and simplifies procedure. 
But the persistent risks of market-sharing which may be engendered b y the 
various distribution agreements or patent licences must also be borne in 
mind. 
(a) distribution agreements 
- ~~~!~§~~~-~~~!~~~-~~~~~~~~~§ 
The Commission has undertaken a complete recasting of 
Regulation 67 / 67 on the block exemption of exclus ive dealing 
agreements, to take account of European case law, practical experience 
of the application of this regulation, economic developments and the 
future prospects of community enlargement. 
It will soon be submitting to the European Parliament this new 
proposal for a regu lation which should meet the desires previously 
expressed by the Committee on Economic and Nonetary Affairs in 
respect of the exemption of agreements between potential competitors, 
the acceptance of non-reciprocal exclusive dealing agreements b e tween 
competitors where these are small and medium-sized undertakings and 
the size of the territory allotted to sole distributors in the case 
of advanced technology products. 
- 16 - PE 67.815/fin. 
G. 
- selective distribution 
As the Commission obse1·ves, selectivE' c'\istri.but ion , wll<'l:ht'r 
on a qualitative o1· quantitativQ basis, may be n sed t0 lll' l.in1.Ll. mt1J"c 
closely the circle of appointed dealers, to lu1it trade or to 
influence price levels. It is therefore U1portant to see that these 
agreements do not strengthen the tendency towards price rigidity. 
The Commission should therefo re, in the light of its expe rience and 
after consulting those concerned, establish precise regulations on 
selective distribution agreements. 
(b) industrial property 
It is a difficult task to reconcile the aims of industrial and 
commercial property law with the principles of Comrnunity competition 
law. The Commission has been engaged in this for several years. 
7 . As regards patl'nt lice nces a !Jroposal for a 1:egulation applying 
8. 
Article 85( 3 ) to categories of patent licences which comply with the 
exemption conditions laid down in Article 85(3) has been in preparation 
for a number of years. The latest version of this proposal1 was 
received with many reservations by the circles concerned . The fear 
o f industry is that the over-restrictive approach adopted by the 
Commis sion should stand in the way of transfers of technology in the 
community and r educe innovation capacity and prejudice the rights 
attached to patents . The European Parl iament has taken up these 
concerns and asked that the modified version of the proposal for a 
regulation submitted to the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices 
and Dominant Positions should be f on"arded to Parliament . The \Wrk 
of the Commission has at present come to a standstill pending t11e 
judgment of the Court of Justice in the 'maize seed' case (258/ 7 8) 
which touches on problems connected with the restrictive nature of 
exclusive dealing a nd t erritorial protection . 
the trademark 
On many occasions the European Parliament has had the opportunity 
to stress that the implementation of a trademark law applicable 
throughout the Community would doubtless contribute to the liberalization 
of trade in goods and s ervices cnvP.red by such trademarks. The 
Commission has very recently submitted a proposal for a regulation 
on the community trademark and a proposal for a directive on national 
trademark laws. 
l OJ No. C 58, 3.3.1979 
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2. The scope of the competition rules contained in the Treaties 
9. The non-applicability of competition rules to certain fields of 
economic life seriously undermines the standardization of competition 
conditions in the Community. The Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs has been very attentive to this question of the scope of 
competition policy. 
on this point. 
The Ninth Report contains very few notable details 
A first important step was taken with the publication, on 4 July 
1979, of the Commission's Memorandum on the development of air transport 
services. The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs had the 
opportunity when the draft report on restrictions of competition in the 
air transport sector1 was adopted to approve this memorandum which 
contains various proposals designed to increase competition in this 
field, dealing particularly with the opening up of the market and the 
flexibility and transparency of fares. It is also indispensable that 
the Commission should create for itself a legal instrument which would 
allow it to ensure effectively that companies respect the competition 
rules. Although the regulation at present being prepared confines 
itself to the independent activities of airlines, to the exclusion of 
activities which reflect national constraints, it will not provide the 
instrument which the Commission needs to ensure a genuine increase in 
competition in this field. 
The Commission should also present in the very near future a 
r e gulation for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
to sea transport. Although this regulation should not call into 
question the present structure of sea transport and in particular the 
role of liner conferences, it should however ensure genuine competition 
in this sector. The European Parliament expects to be consulted in 
due course on this proposal. 
financial and insurance sectors 
In contrast, the Ninth Report makes no mention of the specific 
initiative undertaken by the Commission regarding the extension of the 
application of competition rules in the financial and insurance sectors. 
The next report should contain a review of the Comn1ission's activities 
in these two fields. 
1
schwartzenberg report (Doc. 1-724/ 79) 
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(b) the approximation of national law~ 
10. However s t rictly the competition rules contained in the Treaty are 
applied, this will not suffice to bring about the standard ization of 
competition conditions as long as national laws remain too divergent. 
What is needed is the further development of national competition laws 
and at the same time a concerted effort to harmonize legal, technical 
and fiscal provisions. 
1. Principal developments during 1979-1980 
On the subject of developments in national competition policies, 
the Commission considers that the differences betwee n the bodies of 
legislation is gradually diminishing and concludes with the hope 'that 
the increasing consultation and cooperation between t he Commission and 
the Member states at Community level will be instrumental in accelerating 
this process• 1 • 
This wait-and-see policy is hardly compatible with the real develop-
ment of competition legislation in the Nember States which sometimes 
shows a serious and persistent inadequacy in certain Member States, 
particularly Italy, and also o. divergence in the development of the 
policies pursued. This is the case forexample with the various recent 
national la,.vs relating to the s upervision of mergers which might c a1.;se 
difficulties when the regulation on the control of mergers still waiting 
to be dealt with by the Council is finally impleme nte d. 
2. Legal provisions on monopolies 
11. The European Court of Justice, in its recent judgment of 13 March 
19792 gave a ve ry useful de finition of Article 37 of t he EEC Treat~i 
concerning the progr essive adj m~tment of state monopo lies of a commercial 
character . The Court stressed on this occasion the fact that the 
existence of state monopolies should not be allowed to prejudice the 
equality of opportunity which must be guaranteed to product s imported 
from other Member States. The Court condemned the discrimination which 
existed in respect of Article 37 in the sale, in the case of the French 
alcohol monopoly, of alcohol subsidized from public funds at an abnormally 
low resale price in comparison with alcohol of s i milar quality which 
might be imported from other Member States. 
1Ninth Report on competition policy, point 45, page 41 
2Judgment of 13 March 1979 - Case 91/78 Hansen, Reports 1979, p. 935 
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12. 
The Conunission should therefore, with t11e support of this new 
piece of case law, spare no efforts to ensure in the near future that 
henceforth none of the existing conunercial monopolies should be in 
breach of Article 37 of the EEC Treaty. Final l y, it is noted with 
satisfact ion that, as envisaged in the Eighth Report on competition 
policy, the new oil regime introduced in France on 29 June 1979 now 
conforms with Article 37 of the Treaty. 
3. Elimination of technical and administrative barriers to trade 
- EE~~~~~E~-!~E-~!!~!~~~!~~-~~~~~~~~!-~~EE!~E~ 
1 
The Thirteenth General Report records the adopt ion by the 
Council of 11 new directives and by the Conunission of 7 directives 
adapting existing provisions to technical progress. Th is figure 
which is comparable to the preceding years suggests a fairly 
slow rate of elimination. 
As the Conunission indicates, the revival of protectionist 
measures which the Conununity is at present confronting represents 
a risk for the principle of the free circulation o f goods. 
The deterioration of the situation in this field, b esides 
representing a setback for basic Community achievements, may 
seriously upset the pursuit of a genuine competition policy. 
In these circumstances, it is important to follow up the 
deliberations which the European Parliament in particular has 
instigated over the last few years on the improvement of 
procedures. The Conunission realizes that the effort which has 
been proceeding for ten years should be 'amplified and 
diversified' with a clearer definition of the policy line wh ich 
the Conunission intends to pursue 2 • The Commission stresses 
the need to 'tackle the immense area of technical barriers 
resulting not from mandatory legal provisions but from the 
adoption of different standards by the Member States' standards 
institutions' and to 'prevent new barriers from being set up'. 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice, in the 'Cassis de 
Dijon' case 3 very opportunely laid dmvn the interpretation 
which would permit proceedings against new forms of barriers 
to trade which contravene the Treaty. Apart from the proposal 
for a directive concerning products for the building trade which 
the council has not yet adopted, the Conunittee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs can only i nsist once again on its de sire for a 
simplified procedure for the elimination o f barriers under 
-------------------
1Th irteenth General Report, point 101, p.75 
2Thirteenth General Report, point 99, p.74 
3case 120/78, 20 February 1979 - Reports 1 979 , p . 649 
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Article 155 of the EEC Treaty to be extended in the near future 
to all barriers. 
The inadequate harmonization of legislation and of 
transparency concerning public contrac·ts is an obstacle to the 
standardization of competition conditions 'and indus·trial development 
in the Community. The Commission should therefore keep a strict 
watch on compliance by the Member States with the directives on the 
awarding of contracts adopted so far since this compliance has 
not always been forthcoming as the table below shows. 
PUBLIC SUPPLY CONTRACTS 
Number of notices of public contracts 
advertized in the Official Journal 
lJK ••••••• •.... :; 
D •••••••••• • •• 
F ••.••.•..•••• 
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121 
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114 
198 
3 
0 
5 
H 
l'; -1 
5S7 l 
-------' L---·-- -- ~----·-- .,:___ ____ .... -·------' - --- ... _,._-. -----
.. 
The Commission has moreover recently presented recommendations 
concerning telecommunications designed, amongst other things, 
to extend existing Community procedure in this sector. The 
Commission is asked to submit proposals in other sectors. which 
have not yet been covered by the supplies directive, such as 
transport and energy. 
4. Tax harmonization 
14. The standardization of competition conditions also requires 
a minimum amount of tax harmonization within-the Community if 
discrimination and distortion are not to be perpetuated. In this 
respect there are several Commission proposals still before ·the 
.council; including the proposal for a seventh directive on VAT 1 
~ritten Question by Mr M~ller, No. 511/80 of 9 June 1980 
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(us~d goods and worY.s o f art), the tenth d irective on the hiring of 
moveable tangible property and the proposal fo r a directive ~or a 
common taxation system applicable to parent companies and sutsic1 ia ril" s 
of various Member States and the proposal for a directive on a con®on 
taxation system applicable to mergers, hive-offs and transfers of 
1 
assets , these two last proposals being very old since the European 
Parliament's opinion dates from 9 April 1970. 
As regards excise duties on alcohol, the r-ecent decisio n s of t he 
European court of Justice handed down on 27 February 1980 are i mportant 
since the discrimination on the amount of tax imposed on alc oholic 
beverages in France, Italy, Denmark and Ireland is criticized b y t he 
Court as being contrary t o Article 95 of the EEC Treaty. Mor e o ve r , 
the United Kingdom imposes five times more tax on wine than on bee r . 
Without giving a definite ruling, the Court of Justice has p a rtly 
admitted the Con®ission's submission that wine and beer are products 
which are to a certain degree inte rchangeable and tlwrefore in 
compet ition. 
Moreover, on 26 Jun e 1979 the Con®ission fo1~arded a con®unication 
to the Council containing compromise solutions for the main prob l ems 
connected with the harmonization of the structure of excise dut i e s on 
beer , wine and alcohol. It is to be hoped that in this complex 
matter a solution will soon be found to put a stop to these t a x -
generated distortions of competition. 
As concerns direct taxation, attention is drawn to the desire 
? 
expressed by the European Parliament last year- that tax harmon i zation 
should not be limited to collection systems but should also exte nd to 
rates and to the basis oE assessment. 
Finally, the tax element of energy costs var\es greatly from one 
Member State to another; it seems essential that the Con®ission sho u l d 
work together with the a uthorities of the Member States to seek 
means of standardizing at least to some extent the cost of energy . 
Given the importance of this factor in most production processes , 
serious competition distortion will continue to affect firms in the 
Membe r States as long as tax diffe rences in this field have no t been 
ironed out. 
~ritten Question by Mr Se e ler, No. 60/80 of 19 March 1980; 
2 Interim report by Mr Nyborg on a proposal for a directive on the 
harmonization of company taxation and of withholding taxes on dividends , 
resolution, (Doc.l04/79) 
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C. International codification of competition rules 
17. The European Community's compet ition policy cannot be studied 
18. 
in isolation from the world context. There must be harmonization 
of competition rules at world level and international cooperation 
in the fight against those monopolies which operate to the detriment 
of the market, and against any misuse of dominant positions which 
may not be covered either by Community legislation or national 
legislation. Although this will be very difficult to achieve, the 
Community must do everything it can to help. 
In fact, the Community cannot create a genuine internal 
competition policy without detriment to itself if it does not seek 
to extend the rules which it imposes on itself to the other countries 
of the world. 
1. Work concerning restrictive practices in international trade 
The 9th Report contains suff iciently precise ctetails of the state 
of progress of work in the OECD and UNCTAD. 
work in the OECD 
On 25 September 1979 the OECD Council adopted two recommendations, 
one on increased cooperation between member countries on restrictive 
practices affecting international trade and the other asking govern-
ments of Member States to restrict the number and scope of exemptions 
to regulations. More information could be provided on the exact 
scope of these recommendations. 
The problems of concentration and competition policy and those 
posed by purchasing power have been or are to be the subject of 
reports by OECD workin9 parties. 
work in UNCTAD 
19. UNCTAD held a conference on restrictive business practices from 
19 November to 7 December 1979. 
On this occasion attitudes did come closer, particularly bebveen 
Group Band the Group of 77, on the non-binding legal nature of 
principles and rules in respect of preferential treatment, on the 
exceptions given under national and regional laws and the status 
of relationships between companies of the same group. It was 
possible to conclude negotiations on the establishment of an inter-
national code on restricted business practices in April 1980. 
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As regards the c ode of conduct on transfer of technology, negotiations 
have not yet be en concluded. There is an agreement on the non-binding 
legal nature of the code, on the principle o f adoption of the code (in the 
form of a United Nations resolution) and on eleven clauses (price maintenance, 
tying , patent pools and cross licences). But on a number of other clauses, 
the Ninth Re port indicates that the industrialized market economy countries 
have not ye t given their agr eement. While taking into consideration 
wherever possible the inhere nt constraints of developing countries, it is 
in fact important that Community competition law and even more so the 
competition policies of the various Member States should not be outflanked 
by certain UNCTAD proposals which link competition with other political 
objectives. 
2. Tax havens 
As the Commission again stated during the colloquium on international 
tax avoidance organized by the Council of Europe from 5 - 7 March 1980, 
isolated action by the Community could cause a fligh t of capital toward s 
third countries . This prob lem of international tax a voidance can only be 
solved by concerted action on a large r scale. 
This statement must be followed up by action . But the Commission 
seems to be waiting for the acceptance of recip rocal procedures between 
the administrations of Member States before fighting tax avoidance. This 
is self-delus ion. At the same time it is too easy for the Con~iss ion to 
make regular reference to the r eport which it undertook in 1972 on the tax 
arrangements applying to hold ing companies (this report contains an analysis 
of the problems arising fron1 international tax avoidance inside and outside 
the community) since the Council has never discussed t his report1 . 
Contrary to the thesis put forward by the Commission2 , maintenance 
of genuine competition implies the progressive abolition of tax havens. 
It is for the Commiss i on to encourage Member States to look at this que stion 
and to generate concerted action vis-a-vis adjacent states wh ich are in the 
nature of tax havens and with the signatory states of the Lorn~ Convention. 
It is in fact inconsistent and pointless to enforce competition rules 
within the Community and at t he same time to acknowledge that tax avoidance 
can thrive on the edge or even in the centre of this Community 
(Switzer land) • 
1Answer to the writ t en question by Mr Deb r~ No. 1492 / 7 9 of 15 J anuary 1 980 
? 
-Answer to the written question by fvlrs VAYSSADE and r-tr J . HOREAU, 
No. 83 / 80 , OJ No . C 167/ 29 
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3. Flags of convenience 
21. Genuine competition in the field of international commercial 
shipping would require the progressive abolition of flags o f convenience. 
The negotiations which were held during January 1980 within the context 
of UNCTAD have not been concluded . The Commission should not confine 
itself simply to taking part in these confe rences but should also make 
a more active effort to seek ways of remedying this state of affairs. 
II. CONTROLLED COMPETITION 
22. Genuine competition must also be equitable. The objective of 
a rational competition policy designed principally for the general 
interest of the Community should not be confined to the strict and 
automatic applicat ion of the competition rules which the Community has 
adopted . Perfect competition is a theoretical model. It would also be 
wron~ to s~'o k competi.tivent:'f3 ~~ ;Jt nn y p1·ice . •rhe warket mnst not l 'ccome 
a jnn~l],• . On tlh' cont-t·:1ry , l'PlllpPtition bet.\vCl~n tlw main Cl'Onomic 
opera tors, private ;:1nd publ ic , mu~t b 0 urgani ;~ed and adapted where 
necessary to take account or their size , the aims \vhich they pursue and 
the functions wh ich they fulfil. 
A. Supervision of the activities of private firms 
23. The wish to improve the procedure for the application of Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty to exclusive agreements and the abuse of dominant 
positions has alread y been indicated above. Indeed, strict application 
of these provisions is essential if a check is to be kept on the activities 
o f private firms. 
But the present ceononLi c ci.n·ums Lnnces, anct in pa 1·Licnlar the ncecl to 
radically r.corgani sl' th<J p1·odnctio n apparatus, means that in cert ain 
conditions and provide d the firms have the capacity, in a given sector the 
firms themselves may and must play their due role as regards restructuring. 
It is important that in each sector affected by restructuring solutions 
should be chosen which are the least onerous from the point of view of 
social and budgetary costs and the most likely to re-establish competitive-
ness in the sector concerned. This is the problem of the crisis cartels. 
- crisis cartels 
24. The Commiss ion accepts 1 that such agreements between firms aimed at 
reducing structural excess capacity may be authorized under Article 85(3) 
'but only where the firm has not simultaneously, whether by agreement or 
concerted practice, fixed either prices or production or delivery quotas'. 
The Commission is at present looking at the compatibility with Article 85 
of the amended agreement between producers of man-made fibres. 
1Eighth Report on competition policy, page 12 
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At all events, as the commis sion recalls 1 , it is important in such cases 
that the firms concerned should take the necessarr mea~m:es to limit the 
social repercussions of r estructuring operations. 
It is to be hoped that the acceptance, under these strict conditions, 
of price cartels in certain sectors in difficulties will be a problem of 
no more than a short-term economic nature. On the other hand, the 
constant evolution of the market towards a generalized oligopolistic 
structure a ffects the very concept of competition. 
25. In the Ninth Report, the Commission notes the following development 
during the last decade as r egards the concentration of markets: 
- a constant growth of oligopoly , the effect of which is to reduce both 
the scope and intensity of c ompetition, 
- a grad ual and continuolls ~rrowtll, in both absolut~' anct relative terms, 
in the size of industrial production units, and even more so in the size 
of trading units, 
- the development of a new form of oligopolistic specialization at 
transnational level in which elements of competition are closely bound 
up with elements of technical or commercial cooperation and quasi-
monopolistic rigidity . 
The Commission cannot confine itself simply to ascertaining this 
new trend towards a dynamic oligopolistic equilibrium lying, as it states, 
2 
somewhere between competition and collusion • Moreover, the Commission's 
conclusions are corroborated by a recent report published by the OECD in 
February 1980 on concentration and competition policy. The OECD committee 
of experts responsible for this report considered that the present level 
of concentration which is already very high in a certain number of important 
branches of industry could have disastrous political and social consequences. 
To counter this development, the report contained a number of suggestions 
such as the refinement of statistics (by branch of industry and also the 
overall concentration by Member State) and the strengthening of legislation 
on the control of horizontal, vertical or heterogeneous mergers . 
This trend makes it all the more necessary today for the Council to 
adopt the regulation on the control o f concentrations which has been before 
it since 1974. 
1 Answer to the written question by Mrs Vayssade, Mr Pecheron, Mr Moreau 
and Mr Martinet, No. 1098/79 - OJ No. c 137, 9 June 1 980 
2 . . Nlnth Report, polnt 221 , page 141 
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Generally speaking, this t rend calls fo r a redefinition of the 
Comm ission's competition pol icy going beyond case-by-case decision s under 
Artic les 85 and 86. Competit ion policy should be re o rientated so that 
the c ontrol o f concentration, combined with integrated assistance, can 
pre vent any irreversible deve l opment of the market away from an optimum 
level of competition, without \vhich competition "''il l be neitl~e r genuine 
nor equitable. 
B. s upervision of the activities of public undertaking s 
26 . A Eirst directive on the transparency of fina ncial relations betwe e n 
Member State s and public undertakings, a directive a d\'Ocated by t he 
European Par liament for many yea rs, was adopted by the Commission o n 
, 
2 '::i . ;une J. ~8l~ '. Th ~ Con~~t t e ~ on s~onrn~~c and Monetary Aff~1~s, vh1c~ 1s 
kept in f ormed of t he Commission ' s gene r al guidel ines in this fie ld , expressed 
its agre ement with this subject2 It is i ndeed important to establish 
equitable t reatment b etwe en pr ivate and p ubl i c undertakings. The latter 
s hould not benef i t f rom undue advantages but at the same time t he constra ints 
inherent i n the ir ob l igations as a public service mus t be taken carefu lly 
into cons ide rat ion. If there is to be fai r treatment between private and 
public undertakings it is indispensable to cre ate the necessary transparency 
o f financial relations between public unde rtakings and state s. 
Th is first directive adopted by t he Commis sion does not cover the 
major public service s (water, electricity, transport, post, telecommuni-
cations, banks and savings b anks). As it stands 90% of the undertakings 
it covers are Italian and virtually al l the rest French . 
The Commission must move on from t:his first s tage, which is very 
re strictive in scope, and it is to be l1oped that t h e work undertaken to 
examine specific measures to ensure a s i milar transparency for the public 
undertakings which are at present excluded will be concluded fairly 
rapidly. 
c. Controlling the activities of transnational undertaki ngs 
27. Contrary to the wish expr essed in the European Parliament's last 
r eport 3 , the Ninth Report does not conta in a re v iew of action on the 
act ivit ies of transnational undertakings. This is regrettable. It can 
indeed be seen to what extent the transnational companies, by virtue of 
1
oJ No. L 195, 29 Ju l y 1980 
2Meet ing of 31 January 1980 
3
oamseaux Re port, Doc . l-625 / 7 9 , r esolut ion, paragraph 18 
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their size, their liquid a s sets and the conce ntration of their power 
of decision are able to exert a dominant position on the market thus 
gradually reducing free competition. 
Without going into detail at this point on the very broad ques tion 
of the international economic activity of undertakings and governments 
which is at present the subject of a report being prepared by the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs1 , mention should be made here 
again of some essential measures which must be taken, without discrimi-
nating against these companies, in order to control the activities of 
multinationa l s particularly with regard to the campaign against tax 
avoidance. 
Tht' J<.~arth of inst i tutional activity evidenc<-d by the Com'll ission 
in this field is very regrettable, as we have stated above . Apart 
from work in international bodies in which it has taken part, the 
Commission does not seem to have taken any particular initiative on 
transfer prices . But, essentially , the phenomenon of tax avoidance 
takes the form of transfer prices. The OECD's recent very precise 
2 
study on this subject does however give very exact details of the 
various manifestations, consequences and means of controlling and 
preventing such manipulations. 
The European Parliament has often clearly expressed its point of 
view on the question of fighting the tax avoidance practised by trans-
national companies 3 and has asked not only for regulations on transfer 
prices but also for an improvement in the information provided about 
the operations of transnational companies (regular compilation and 
publication of details of transactions by transnational companies). 
Reference is also made, f or the record, to the Commission's proposal 
of June 1974 on tax arrangements for holding companies, which is still 
hefore the Council. 
control of concentrations and investments 
The procedures for obtaining information and exerting control, 
whether legal, fiscal or finanC"ial, and the implementation of codes of 
conduct will not by themselves reduce ~1e harmful intrigues of 
1
caborn draft report on enterprises and governments in international 
economic activity (PE 66.923) 
2Report of the OECD's Fiscal Affairs Committee on transfer prices 
in multinational firms, 1979. 
3 Leenhardt report (Doc. 292/74) adopted on 12 December 1974 -
Lange report (Doc. 547/76) adopted on 19 April 1977 
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transnationa l companies. 
to these measures. 
It is necessary to add preventive provisions 
Indeed, the best way of controlling the transactions of transnational 
companies is for the international community to assume the right to 
control and if needs be to limit the development of these companies. 
The Thirteenth General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities makes no mention of progress in the Council (there are still 
differences on the annual business figures, the mandatory or voluntary 
nature of notification and on the exclusive or non-exclusive nature of 
the Commission's powers). Thus, at present, and in the absence of any 
regulations, the Community has no legal means, barring Article 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty, of controlling the concentration which while not being 
exclusively the domain of transnational firms is one of their most 
pronounced characteristics. 
Supervision of investments constitutes another form of preventive 
control of operations by transnational firms. It would be desirable for 
the multinational undertakings to be obliged to report on their projected 
investments to the appropriate authorities in the countries where the 
investments are to be made . There should be international agreements 
to harmonize existing national regulations on investment. 
D. Aid to small firms 
29. Inequitable compE!tition which favours large production or trading 
units is bound to harm small firms . 
In order to enable small firms to make a contribution to the dynamism 
of the economy and to innovation, competition rules should not put a brake 
on their development and should be adapted to their needs and their 
specific nature. 
The Ninth Report contains few new elements in this respect. Thus 
the revised draft block exemption regulation for patent licences has bee n 
made more flexible vis-a-vis small f irms since the Commission indicates 
that in its view 'export bans can be exempted only under certain tightly 
defined conditions, notably in favo ur of small and medium-sized businesses• 1 . 
Similarly in the chapter de vote d to the main decisions and standards 
for the application of competition ru les the Commission reports, with 
regard to the Transocean decision2 , the continuation of the practice of 
taking decisions in favour of coope r ation agreements which support the 
competitiveness of small firms. 
1Ninth Report, point 11, page 22. 
2Ninth Report, point 87, page 60. 
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Apart from this wish to adapt corr.petitibn rules to the specific 
nature of small firms, the European Parliament stressed very clearly 
in the preceding report the need to promote favourable fiscal, 
financial, technological and administrative conditions f or small 
f inns. It is interesting to note in this respect the Conunission' s 
intention, recorded in its docume nt on new in f orn1ation technologies, 
to accelerate the transfer of in f ornmtion to small and med ium-sized 
companies 1 • The important thing here is to allow small firms access 
to data banks designed to promote their development with regard to 
exports and cooperation and international sub-contracting, and to 
make management tasks easier. 
But apart from this, the Commission seems to have take n hardly 
any initiatives in the tax field, and particularly regarding adminis-
tration, to allow small firms to overcome their disadvantages as 
regards competition vis-a-vis the large economic nnits. A whole 
range of measures is nee ded to allow small firms to compete on an 
equal footing, including tax measures (staggered payment of death 
duties, tax relief for new or expanding small f irms), financial 
facilities (loans from the EIB and also from other Community 
institutions in particular the ERDF; full involvement of small firms 
in the procedures for deciding on and controlling the allocation of 
these funds) and increased vocational training facilities. 
III. BENEFICIAL COMPETITION 
Competition should not be considered in isolation; it must be 
beneficial to the economy in general, to which it can have the merit 
of imparting dynamism, to competitiveness and to the consumer. 
However, it is difficult today for Community citizens to believe 
in the much-vaunted merits of competition while inflation and unemploy-
ment continue to be rife. This means that any examination of 
competition policy must look at what the objectives of competition 
should be. 
A. The merits of competitiveness for the economy 
30. Competition can only be beneficial for the economy in genera l 
if it is properly organized. In a mixed economy where the laws 
of the market and state support have to be combined, the larges t 
possible measure of consistency has to be sought, while preserving 
the competitiveness of industry and the interests of the workers, 
sectors and regions concerned. 
This requires i n particular effective integration of state 
1
ooc. COM(79) 650 final, point 3.3.3, page 29. 
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~id ~nd th~ pursuit of long-te rm consistency in the conduct of 
compe tition policy and its dovetailing ~ith other Community pol icies. 
(a) Integration of aid 
31. In a general statement, the Commission notes that 1 the year 
32. 
33. 
1979 ~as essentially one of consolidation•. This serene approach 
contrasts with the announce ment made by the Commis sion that it has had 
to insist recently that Member States shou ld notify it of all aid 
projects in pursuance of Article 93 of the EEC Treaty. Reading throw;h 
the chapter concerned with aid, it would appear that as in the past 
the Commission is experiencing man y difficulties in this complex 
and delicate field in enforcing compliance with competion rules and 
often only manages to do this by way of laborious compromi ses which 
in many cases considerably slow down its action. 
The Commission sees to the proper application of the revised 
principles on the coordination of regional aid, in force since 1 
January 1979. It is good t o ee that the Commission has started 
looking into the problem of the combination of regi ona 1 aid \~i th 
other types of assistance. It i s important that regi onal aid should 
be as transparent as possible in order to counter the tendenc y which 
has sometimes been noted f or certain Member States, for example, to 
reduce their own regional aid as Community aid is increased. In this 
respect it should also be noted t hat the Commission is trying to improve 
the quality of regional statistics. 
- sectoral aids: 
The need to integrate aid has been particularl y felt in the 
industrial sectors which are afflicted by the cri sis. 
In the shipbuilding sector the Commission has applied the 
provisions contained in the f ourth directive adopted in April 1978 
and this has helped to reduce competition di stortions. The continua-
tion of the crisis makes it impossible to suspend this aid in the 
immediate future and war r ants the presentati on of a f ifth directive 
to run until 31 December 1982 covering all aid s wnich directly or 
indirectly affect competition conditions. Such aid mu st be provis i onal 
and degressive. 
In the iron and steel sect or, on 18 Dece mber 1979 the Council 
ga~e its unanimous assent to a draft decision establishing Community 
rules for specific aid to the steel industry. The Ninth Report 
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comments on the provis ions c ontained in this de c isi on b~t went to 
press too early to contain a f ir s t revi ew of the application of this 
procedure. It will be recall e d that the decision applies until 
31 December 1981 and provides that all aid given to iron and steel 
industries should be subject to control. T"bis i.s essential if the 
rules are to retain their fairne ss and effectiveness . The European 
Parliament also stressed at the t ime the need t o avoid any discrimi-
nation between public undertakings and private enterprise. The 
Commission's Tenth Report should consequently contain a complete 
review of the enforcement of this decision and the extent to which 
its provisions have been observed. 
For the textiles and clothing industries the Commis sion has 
decided in view of the persistent considerable excess of capacity 
to extend the aid control measures by a further two year s. 
'1'he control of getwr<l L_ai d_ schc__!l~s cont inu.os to p resent the 
Commission with certain problems since it is u nable to take a 
definitive position on general aid schemes when they are first 
notified 1 In the past the European Parliame nt h as noted the slowness 
with which certain of these aids are phased out whe n they are incom-
patible with the rules of the Treaty and it is :for the Commission to 
work out a more expedient procedure . 
The same applies to export aids. within t .1e Community where the 
procedure followed by the Commiss ion again apoears t o be very slow 2 
In intra-Community relations such aids arc absolute l y incompatible 
with t he general p rincip l e of the Co~mon Market, except in certain 
cases involving small fir ms . 
Finally the Europea n Par liament must insist that the Commission 
keep a strict check on employment aid which is only acce ptable if its 
genuine objective is to create new jobs. 
(b) Social and regional require ments 
34. Exceptions can ~nly be made to the competition rules contained 
in the Treaty regarding exclusive agreements or aid if other social, 
economic, or regional factors are involved. It goes without saying 
that competition makes f or a better distribution of the factors of 
production, and encourages innovation and economic progress. However 
during a period of recession and industria l reorganization it may 
become necessary partially to suspend t he application of comp.etition 
rules to allow a certain economic sector to reorganize itself. 
This is provided for in the Treaties and this is what the Commission 
1 Ninth Report on competition policy, point 183, p.lll 
~ Ninth Report on competition policy, point 188, p. 114 
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35 . 
has had to do when it authorizes, for example, crisis cartels,or 
accepts variou s kinds of aid or fixes production quotas, minimum 
prices or gu ide prices . 
In this respect the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
cannot emphasize strongly enough that the extra benefits which 
indutry gains from exceptional measures adopted by the Commission 
as a result of the reduction or S'Jspension of competition must h e 
used to protect jobs, or reorganize or modernize the production 
apparatus. 
Thus it is for the Commission to prevent, especially during a 
period of recession , the uncontrolled granting of aid by States to 
multinational firms. Such aid distorts competition, ruins th~ 
effectiveness of programmes for spe cific sectors or regions as de-
fined by the commission and is entirely unwarranted from the social 
or regional point of view. 
In this respect the Commission's de~ision to ban aid which the 
Dutch Government was intending to grant to the subsidiary of a 
large international group in the manufactured tobacco sector 
. 1 (Phi lip Morris) is of great lnterest 
(c) The consistency of Commu nity policies 
The European Parliament has often stressed in its report the 
need to ensure close coordination between the competition policy 
and other Community policies. The introduction to the Ninth Report 
states that 'if we are to advance towards greater economic and 
social j ustice, other Community policies must be pressed into service, 
always of course ensuring that they are consistent with the competit ion 
. ,2 pG>llcy 
The Ninth Report unf~ tunatel y does not contain a chapter on the 
effect of other community policies on competition (contrary to the 
desire of the European Parliament expressed in 1979 ) ; this would make 
it possible to ascertain any conflicts between the various policies 
") 
and to put things right J. Here it can only be recalled that competition 
policy cannot be isolated from other policies whether \-.:ithin or out-
side the Community a nd it is therefore necessar y to ensure the closest 
possible coordination both between Directorate-Generals (DG I , IV, 
VIII and III) and within the College of Comissioners. 
B. The Merits of competition for the consumer 
The consumer is the final judge of the advanta g es of competition 
·l Thirteenth General Report, point 164, p. 100 
2 Ninth Report, introduct ion, page 11 
3 DAMSEAUX report, explanatory statement p. 28 , point 28 
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but it ~o~ld not seem on reading the Nin t h Re port that the consu me r 
wou l d have any r eason to b e generall y satis fied with the present 
state of conditions re garding competition in the Communi ty . In fact 
one notes a constant increase in prices and too many p rice anomal ie s, 
and the fact that consumer organizations ha ve insufficient say in 
the way competition policy is carried out? 
(a) Prices 
If there was genuine competition there would a lso be 
a drop in prices. Most often this is not the case. The Commission note s 
that during the las t ten year s there has been a constant growth of 
oligopoly which has progressively reduced the scope and intensity 
. . 1 
of compet~t~on 
2 The Maldague Report stressed at the time the harmful conse-
que nces for compet ition, the level of prices and inflation of the 
de ve lopme nt o f 'meso-economic ' undertakings. The strategies of the 
large firms (price umbre llas, price ceilings,) inevitably lead to a 
virtual elimination of lower price ranges. The only remed y for this 
sit ua tion is for the Commis s ion to have, among other things, instru-
ments which will enable it to prevent, by controlling investments and 
concentrations, any irreve rsible development of t he market a wa y from 
an opti mum degree of competition. 
(b) Price Anomalies 
37. During the year under review the Commission has unde rtaken 
enquiries on the formation of prices, and more particularly on the 
distribution and formation of prices with regard to f ood3 . The out-
come of the se enquiries as report e d in the Ninth Report shows the 
existence o f serious anomalies in price formation. The methods used 
by the large trading units as part of their strategy are nu merous: 
- considerable and frequent varia t ions in p rice s independent of 
production costs, the sole purpose being to 're nder the market less 
tra nsparent and confuse the consumerf; 
- frequent changes in 'loss leaders', 
- the launching of unbranded products a t prices calculated to e liminate 
branded goods, followed by dra stic increases in those prices once 
they have won a substantial slice of the market 
l Ninth Report, point 221, p. l4l 
2 Ma lda gue report on the prob lems of inflation ~ 1976, pp . 7 et seq. 
3 Ninth Report, point 224 et s eq , p. 1 52 
4 Ninth Report, point 223, p . 1 54 
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38. 
These strategies often ultimately lead to considerable price 
disparities between the countries of the Communit y1 
All in all, the consumer is the victim of these strategies 
involving the blocking or excessive dispersal of prices. These 
policies are contrary to the rules of competi tion and also reinforce 
the powers of the large distributors to the detriment not only of 
consumers but also of producers if the prices charged put a brake 
on consumption. 
Consequently such practices are inequitable, they are harmful to 
the general economy and should be eliminated. Unfortunately the 
Commission, as the European Parliament has often stressed, confines 
itself to noting this state of affairs without really implementing 
t . h" h ld t d t th 1" 2 ac 1on w 1c cou pu an en o ese anoma 1es . 
(c) The involvement of consumers in competition policy 
It goes without saying that to combat such practices which 
distort competition and reduce greatly the advantages which can be 
expected of competition, the Commission could find no better ally 
than the consumers' organizations. Their close involvement in 
competition policy is, as has been stated above, therefore necessary 
and it is for the Commission to seek ways and means of ens u ring this. 
1 
2 
The Ge rman record dealer has to pay 62% more than his British 
counterpart - in the drinks trade disparities are also very 
marked (point 251) 
Ninth Report on competition polic y, point 259, p. 165: 'Here we 
have a series of anomalies of competition which are without doubt 
serious and detailed specific studies are accordingly in progre ss• . 
- 35 -- PE 67 . 815/ fin. 

